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ARTICLES
STRICTLY SCRUTINIZING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
RESTRICTIONS (AND THE COURTS THAT
JUDGE THEM)
John C. Eastman+
"Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribu-
tion limits was not a pretense of the Buckley [v. Valeo] per curiam opin-
ion."' This may be the Supreme Court's greatest understatement in the
election law arena. For nearly a quarter of a century, lower courts grap-
pled with whether the Buckley Court, when upholding restrictions on
contributions to candidates, actually applied a lower standard of review
than the strict scrutiny standard it applied when striking down various• 2
restrictions on expenditures. Even the Court could not agree on
whether Buckley actually applied a lower level of scrutiny to political
contributions-speech, or at least expressive conduct that lies at the very
core of the First Amendment-than it applied to other kinds of speech
and expressive conduct.3
Earlier this year however, a majority of the Court put that question to
• 4
rest, at least with respect to restrictions on contributions to candidates.
However, the numerous opinions in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC reveal deep division in the Court, even on this preliminary
' J.D., University of Chicago; Ph.D., Claremont Graduate School; Associate Professor at the
Chapman University School of Law; and Director of the Claremont Institute Center for Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence. In the latter capacity, Dr. Eastman is counsel for Plaintiffs in Lincoln Club
of Orange County v. City of Irvine, a case raising a First Amendment challenge to a municipal
ordinance that restricts contributions to independent expenditure committees. Lincoln Club of
Orange County v. City of Irvine, No. 99-1262 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2000). This case is currently
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See id., appeal dock-
eted, No. 99-CU-1262 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2000).
1. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897,903 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 636-39 (8th Cir. 1995) (devoting a substan-
tial portion of the opinion to sorting out the instructions on applying a standard of review
from Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)).
3. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit's rec-
ognition of the disagreement among members of the Buckley Court).
4. See Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 903-04 (recognizing that Buckley upholds such restrictions
if they are "'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest"').
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question on the standard of review. One can expect lingering confusion
as lower courts grapple with the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
other kinds of campaign finance restrictions.
One thing is clear, however. Presently, the Supreme Court applies a
slightly lower level of scrutiny when assessing restrictions on contribu-
tions to candidates than it applies when assessing restrictions on expendi-
tures. As a result, local governments have structured their campaign fi-
nance restrictions as facial limitations on contributions rather than on
expenditures, hoping to find constitutional comfort in the more lenient
level of scrutiny. In making such a simplistic distinction between "con-
tributions" and "expenditures," the Supreme Court misunderstands
Buckley and its rationale, and fails to take into account subsequent cases
in which the Court applied "exacting" or strict scrutiny when assessing
restrictions on contributions to noncandidate committees. Furthermore,
the Court fails to appreciate that such restrictions cannot properly be
sustained, even under the lower level of scrutiny applied to restrictions
on contributions to candidates.
In part to demonstrate the imprecision of the Buckley per curiam
opinion, Part I of this Article summarizes the pre-Nixon circuit split that
created the Buckley standard of review. Part II analyzes restrictions on
election speech and political association in a context that falls between
contributions to candidates and expenditures, namely, contributions to
independent expenditure committees, and tries to reconcile the facially
conflicting holdings in Buckley and Citizens Against Rent Control v. Ber-
keley.5 Looking beyond the simplistic distinction between "contribu-
tions" and "expenditures," this Article contends that limits on contribu-
tions to independent expenditures infringe upon core First Amendment
rights of political speech and association. The impact of this infringe-
ment has been more severe than the Court was willing to acknowledge
concerning the restrictions on contributions to candidates at issue in
Buckley and Nixon, and thus must be subject to strict scrutiny. Moreo-
ver, this Article contends that the Supreme Court has applied strict scru-
tiny to such restrictions in the context of contributions to committees
making independent expenditures in a ballot measure election, and that
the same level of scrutiny is appropriate when assessing these restrictions
on contributions to independent expenditure committees in candidate
elections. Part III contends that restrictions on contributions to inde-
pendent expenditure committees are unconstitutional even under the
slightly-less-than-strict, "rigorous" scrutiny that the Court now applies to
5. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
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restrictions on contributions to candidates. Therefore, these restrictions
are clearly unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny that should be ap-
plied.
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT BEFORE NIXON
The Supreme Court in Nixon clarified that Buckley applied, albeit
cryptically, a less than strict level of scrutiny (though more than interme-
diate scrutiny) when assessing restrictions on contributions to candi-
dates.6 However, prior to this decision, the courts of appeals were split
on what level of scrutiny Buckley actually applied. Most courts held that
Buckley required strict scrutiny of restrictions on contributions to candi-
dates as well as restrictions on expenditures. The Ninth Circuit, in con-
trast, read Buckley as requiring a slightly lower standard of review when
assessing restrictions on contributions to candidates
Both sides of the split found support in the loose language of Buckley's
per curiam opinion. The Eighth Circuit in Carver v. Nixon,' for example,
quoted passages from Buckley that subjected restrictions on contribu-
tions to "the closest scrutiny" because "[c]ontribution and expenditure
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities" and because they "impose direct quantity restrictions on po-
litical communication and association by persons, groups, candidates,
and political parties.' 9 The Eighth Circuit noted that under this stan-
dard, "'a significant interference with protected rights of political associa-
tion may be sustained' only when the State can demonstrate 'a suffi-
ciently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."'''
The Eighth Circuit recognized that various members of the Buckley
Court have contended, in dicta, that a lower level of scrutiny should ap-
ply to restrictions on contributions." The Eighth Circuit also recognized,
however, that other members of the Court have strongly disagreed, "ar-
guing that nothing less than strict scrutiny should apply to contribution
6. Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 904.
7. See, e.g., Harwin v. Goleta Water Dist., 953 F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991).
8. 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995).
9. Id. at 636 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14,18, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
10. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488
(1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960)).
11. See id. at 637 (citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986); California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (CMA);
Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 301 (1981) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring)).
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limits." 2 The Eighth Circuit concluded from these various conflicting
opinions that:
The [Supreme] Court has not ruled that anything other than
strict scrutiny applies in cases involving contribution limits.
When the Court in Buckley analyzed the contribution limits, it
articulated and applied a strict scrutiny standard of review ....
Therefore, like other courts since the Buckley decision, we must
apply the "rigorous" standard of review articulated in Buckley. 3
In a world accustomed to debating what "is" is, it may be argued that
the Eighth Circuit's opinion is a bit schizophrenic. Strict scrutiny, in its
customary formulation, requires that restrictions on First Amendment
rights be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental inter-
est.14 The test recited by the Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, speaks of
a "'sufficiently important interest"' that is "'closely drawn to avoid un-
necessary abridgment of associational freedoms'""'-arguably a some-
what less stringent formulation." Even if one rejects the argument that
"sufficiently important" is less strict than "compelling," or that "closely
drawn" is less strict than "narrowly tailored," there certainly is schizo-
phrenia in the Eighth Circuit equating "strict" scrutiny with the "rigor-
ous" scrutiny articulated in Buckley and as applied by other courts. The
only other decision cited by the Eighth Circuit was Harwin v. Goleta
Water District,'" a case in which the Ninth Circuit expressly stated (albeit
12. ld. (citing CMA, 453 U.S. at 201-02 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Citizens Against
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 302 (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (stating that the
"ordinance cannot survive constitutional challenge unless it withstands 'exacting scru-
tiny"')).
13. Id. at 637 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 and Harwin v. Goleta Water Dist., 953
F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) wherein the Ninth Circuit recognized "that contribution
limits may be subject to a lower level of scrutiny, but requir[ed] the government to show a
'sufficiently important interest and employ[ ] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgement of associational freedoms"' (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)).
14. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (holding that a
restriction on political speech can be upheld "only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest"); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)
(requiring the State to show a subordinating interest that is "compelling" and the em-
ployment of means "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement" in order to uphold
a restriction of freedom of speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (indicat-
ing that "only a compelling state interest ... can justify limiting First Amendment free-
doms").
15. Carver, 72 F.3d at 636 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
16. See, e.g., Daggett v. Webster, 81 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 n.10 (D. Me. 2000). This
district court stated: "I will not engage in the debate whether the 'closely drawn' standard
is nevertheless the same as 'strict scrutiny.' Perhaps the Supreme Court will address that
semantic confusion in Shrink PAC." Id.
17. 953 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1991).
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in dicta) that "contribution limits are subject to a lower level of scrutiny
than expenditure limits."' 8
Whatever its pedigree, the Eighth Circuit held that, under Buckley,
strict scrutiny was to be applied to restrictions on contributions, and con-
firmed this position several times before the Supreme Court's Nixon de-
cision rejected it. In Russell v. Burris, 9 for example, the Eighth Circuit
explicitly rejected the Government's pitch for a more lenient level of re-
view and instead applied Buckley's "'closest scrutiny,"' reiterating that
only restrictions "closely drawn" to further a "compelling interest"
would survive." And in Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams,"1
the Eighth Circuit unambiguously stated that Buckley "articulated and
applied a strict scrutiny standard of review."22
The Fourth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit and upheld restrictions
on contributions by lobbyists only after subjecting them to "strict scru-
tiny."" Similarly, the District Court for the District of Colorado sub-
jected a state contribution limit to "strict scrutiny" because the Buckley
Court had "subjected the Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA) con-
tribution limitations 'to the closest scrutiny. '  As a basis for its deci-
sion, the district court cited a string of Supreme Court decisions that ap-
plied strict scrutiny to various restrictions on First Amendment speech
and associational rights.25 In addition, the Colorado district court relied
18. Id. at 491 n.6.
19. 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998).
20. Id. at 567 (citing Carver, 72 F.3d at 636 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)).
21. 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120
S. Ct. 897, 905 (2000).
22. Id. at 521 (quoting Carver, 72 F.3d at 637); see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101
F.3d 1544, 1553 n.8 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the government's "[s]eizing upon an excerpt
from Buckley" to contend that a lower than strict level of scrutiny applies); Arkansas
Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 983 F. Supp. 1209, 1220 n.10 (W.D. Ark. 1997)
("[B]ased on the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area,
strict scrutiny applies in cases involving contribution limits.").
23. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Carver, 72
F.3d at 637).
24. Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Buckley, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075
(D. Colo. 1999) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29).
25. See id. at 1075-76. The district court cited the following: McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (holding that "when a law burdens core political
speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest"); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990) (stating that classifications affecting political expression
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest); Citizens Against
Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (indi-
cating that "regulation of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial re-
view"); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (imposing "exacting
20001
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on Grant v. Meyer, a case in which the Tenth Circuit subjected restric-
tions on corporate contributions in a ballot measure election to strict
16scrutiny.
District courts in the First and Sixth Circuits had applied strict scrutiny
to restrictions on contributions to candidates. In Fireman v. United
States," the District Court for the District of Massachusetts applied a
strict scrutiny analysis to assess whether FECA's $1,000 contribution
limit warranted criminal sanctions.6 In Frank v. City of Akron,2 9 the
Northern District of Ohio strictly scrutinized an Ohio contribution limit,
noting that "[w]hile the Buckley Court did not employ strict scrutiny lan-
guage, subsequent case law makes clear that strict scrutiny applies."30 Fi-
nally, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. Pauly,3 a Minnesota district
court subjected a contribution limitation to "the closest scrutiny," hold-
ing that such a restriction could be "sustained only when the state dem-
onstrates a compelling state interest and the regulation is closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgement of First Amendment freedoms.
32
As already noted, the Ninth Circuit took a different position, which
also found some textual support in the Buckley opinion. In Goleta Water
District, the Ninth Circuit, citing Buckley, noted in dicta that contribution
limits could be subject to a lower level of scrutiny than expenditure lim-
its.33 The Ninth Circuit recognized what came to be known as Buckley's
"speech by proxy" argument:34
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political ex-
pression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or
group may contribute to a candidate or political committee only
scrutiny" on state-imposed prohibitions of certain political contributions by business cor-
porations); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (noting that "a significant impairment
of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny"). See id.
26. See id.; Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1452 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 486 U.S. 414
(1988).
27. 20 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D. Mass. 1998).
28. Id. at 233.
29. 95 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
30. Id. at 710 n.6. Although the court cited Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907
(6th Cir. 1998), to support this statement, Kruse involved restrictions on expenditures and
was not proper authority for the holding that a restriction on contributions to candidates
was also subject to strict scrutiny. See id. (citing Kruse, 142 F.3d at 913).
31. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (D. Minn. 1999).
32. Id. at 1013 (citing Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,25 (1976) (per curiam)
33. Harwin v. Goleta Water Dist., 953 F.2d 488, 491 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Buck-
ley, 424 U.S. at 20-21).
34. See California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(CMA) (coining Buckley's "speech by proxy" argument).
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marginally restricts the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication. A contribution is a general expression of sup-
port for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communi-
cation by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the
size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size
of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity
of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on
the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or cam-
paign organization involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, because it permits symbolic expression of sup-
port evidenced by a contribution, but does not infringe upon
the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
While contributions may result in political expression if spent
by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters,
the transformation of contributions into political debate in-
volves speech by someone other than the contributor.35
The Ninth Circuit did not address the passages in Buckley from which
the Eighth Circuit and other courts discussed above concluded that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. Moreover, the discus-
sion was dictum. The circuit court simply noted: "While it is conceivably
arguable that a lower level of scrutiny should apply to discriminatory
contribution limits because contribution limits are subject to a lower
level of scrutiny than expenditure limits, . . . we need not decide this
question today."36
Nevertheless, this dictum became holding one year later. In Service
Employees International Union v. Fair Political Practices Commission,7
the Ninth Circuit, again citing the "speech by proxy" passages from
Buckley, held that "[t]he Supreme Court has applied a somewhat less
stringent test than strict scrutiny to decide the constitutionality of contri-
bution limitations."'38 The Ninth Circuit also relied on FEC v. Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life, Inc., in which the Supreme Court stated: "'We
have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less
compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending."'39
This language from Massachusetts Citizens for Life, however, is also
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
36. Harwin, 953 F.2d at 491 n.6 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21).
37. 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992).
38. Id. at 1322 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21).
39. Id. (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
(1986)).
20001
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dicta, as the case involved independent expenditure limitations, not con-
tribution limitations." Moreover, the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for
Life cited California Medical Ass'n v. FEC to support its statement that
restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than re-
strictions on independent spending.4' That proposition from CMA only
garnered a plurality and was specifically rejected by Justice Blackmun in
his concurring opinion, who also recognized the ambiguous "speech by
proxy" provisions of Buckley."
Finally, in Vannatta v. Keisling,43 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior
holding, specifically distinguishing "strict" from "rigorous" scrutiny, by
holding that "[r]estrictions on contributions to campaigns are subjected
to less exacting scrutiny than restrictions on independent expenditures in
support of a campaign." 4 The Ninth Circuit utilized the same "suffi-
ciently important interest" and "closely drawn" means test from Buckley
that courts elsewhere in the country were treating as a strict scrutiny test,
but it stated that "while contribution limitations are reviewed under a
'rigorous' level of scrutiny, they are not reviewed under strict scrutiny., 45
Noting that the test is less stringent than strict scrutiny, the court never-
theless emphasized that it "'is still a rigorous one.'
46
Given the loose language of the Buckley opinion, this confusion among
the circuits was perhaps inevitable. As the District Court for the District
of Columbia noted:
The conflict arises from the broad range of language used in
Buckley. In some places, the Court suggests that all First
Amendment activity should be afforded maximum protection,
see, e.g., 424 U.S. at 14 ...(First Amendment "affords the
broadest protection to political expression"); id. at 14-15 ...
40. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241.
41. Id. at 259-60 (citing California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194, 196-97
(1981) (plurality opinion) (CMA)). The Court also cited NPCAC in support of its dictal
statement. Nothing in NCPAC supports the proposition.
42. CMA, 453 U.S. at 202 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
43. 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998).
44. Id. at 1220 (Brunetti, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, concurring por-
tion was adopted as the unanimous opinion of the court) (citing Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, 479 U.S. at 259-60, for the proposition that the Court has "consistently held that re-
strictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on inde-
pendent expenditures").
45. Id. (citing Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 955
F.2d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir. 1992)).
46. Id. (quoting Service Employees, 955 F.2d at 1322); see also Montana Right to Life
Ass'n v. Eddleman, 999 F. Supp. 1380,1385 (D. Mont. 1998) (citing Buckley as requiring a
"rigorous" standard of review to contribution limitations).
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(First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application"
to political campaigns). However, these excerpts stand in con-
trast to the Court's view, discussed above, that contribution
caps are a relatively minor threat to First Amendment rights...
In the end, none of these passages from Buckley resolves the
question of exactly how to examine contribution caps once they
have been determined to have a severe impact upon free speech
rights.47
Indeed, the Supreme Court did not definitively settle on an applicable
standard of review for more than twenty years after Buckley. When as-
sessing contributions to multicandidate committees in CMA, for exam-
ple, Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality only, claimed that Buckley
applied a lower level of scrutiny to contributions, under a "'speech by
proxy' rationale.48 Justice Blackmun, who provided the necessary and
dispositive fifth vote for the holding in the case, expressly rejected Justice
Marshall's position, contending instead that Buckley subjected contribu-
tion limits to "the closest scrutiny.
'49
The dispute lingered over to the next term. In Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley,0 a majority of the Court applied exacting
scrutiny to strike down Berkeley's restrictions on contributions to com-
mittees making independent expenditures in ballot measure elections.'
Justice Marshall concurred only in the judgment to press his argument
for a lower level of scrutiny: "Because the Court's opinion is silent on the
standard of review it is applying to this contribution limitation, I must as-
sume that the Court is following our consistent position that this type of
governmental action is subjected to less rigorous scrutiny than a direct
restriction on expenditures."52 Yet, the Court was not silent; it applied
"exacting scrutiny," which the Court has elsewhere described as strict
scrutiny.
The reluctance by courts to adopt this lower level of scrutiny proposed
by Justice Marshall seems to be based on the recognition that contribu-
tion limits infringe on one's right to political speech and association in
47. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics,
924 F. Supp. 270, 274 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated as moot and appeal dismissed, 108 F.3d 346,
354 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
48. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(CMA).
49. Id. at 202 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Buckley v. Valco,
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)).
50. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
51. Id. at 294.
52. Id. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2000]
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the election context, rights that lie at the very core of the First Amend-
ment. Although the Supreme Court in Nixon clarified the issue and held
that contributions to candidates are subject to less than strict scrutiny (al-
though still greater than intermediate scrutiny), one can expect lower
courts to remain reluctant and not to extend this holding beyond the nar-
row confines of the contribution-to-candidate context. This proposition
is especially true in light of the fact that Nixon did not purport to over-
rule the use of exacting scrutiny applied by the majority in Citizens
Against Rent Control when assessing restrictions on contributions to
committees making independent expenditures in ballot measure elec-
tions.53
The next section addresses a series of cases that fall between Buck-
ley/Nixon and Citizens Against Rent Control, attempts to discover a co-
herent distinction between the two cases, and assesses whether restric-
tions on contributions to committees making independent expenditures
in candidate elections should be analyzed under the Buckley/Nixon lower
level of scrutiny or the Citizens Against Rent Control strict scrutiny.
II. SCRUTINIZING THE MIDDLE CASE
In Nixon, a majority of the Supreme Court held that contributions to
candidates are entitled to less First Amendment protection than other
kinds of speech.54 At the other end of the campaign finance spectrum,
the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that restrictions on expenditures
are subject to strict scrutiny and can be sustained only if narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling governmental interest.55 This section ad-
dresses three California cases involving municipal ordinances that fall be-
tween those two poles.56 The ordinances challenged in all three cases,
and many others like them not yet challenged, restrict contributions to
independent expenditure committees, and therefore are neither a restric-
tion on contributions to candidates nor a facial restriction on expendi-
tures.
The first case involved the following provision of the Huntington
Beach, California Campaign Reform Law, enacted in 1994:
53. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't, 120 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2000).
54. Id. at 903-04 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21).
55. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 47; FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480,
496 (1985).
56. In another recent case, the Eastern District of North Carolina declined to pre-
liminarily enjoin a North Carolina statute that restricts contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees. See North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F. Supp. 2d
498 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
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Any person or committee, during the twelve (12) months pre-
ceding a City election, that makes independent expenditures or
incurs obligations supporting or opposing city candidate(s) shall
not accept any contribution(s) from any person in excess of the
amounts set forth in Section 2.07.050(a) [$300 for a regular elec-
tion cycle, $200 for a recall election cycle] during the applicable
time periods as set forth in Section 2.07.070 of this Chapter.57
Shortly after its enactment, this provision was challenged in federal
court by a group of individuals who wished jointly to purchase a newspa-
per advertisement in support of or in opposition to candidates in the No-
vember 1994 Huntington Beach municipal elections.58 The United States
District Court for the Central District of California denied the city's mo-
tion to dismiss and essentially held that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional:
[The ordinance] infringes on the Plaintiffs' rights of speech and
of association protected by the First Amendment and the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution .... The
effect of [the ordinance] is to restrict the independent expendi-
tures that Plaintiffs ... desire to make, but a restriction on in-
dependent expenditures is not justified by any sufficiently com-
pelling governmental interest ... [and] on its face also restricts
the contributions that Plaintiff ... desires to make to a commit-
tee for the purpose of making independent expenditures, but
such contributions are even more remotely connected to the
dangers of corruption of candidates than are the independent
expenditures themselves, so likewise are not justified by any
sufficiently compelling governmental interest.59
The election took place before a final judgment was rendered, however,
and the case became moot because the committee that brought the suit
was registered under California law as a single-election-only committee
rather than a permanent committee. 60
The second case involved a very similar provision of San Francisco,
California's Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance:
No person other than a candidate shall make, and no campaign
treasurer shall solicit or accept, any contribution which will
cause the total amount contributed by such person with respect
57. HUNTINGTON BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.07.050(b) (1994).
58. See Righeimer v. City of Huntington Beach, No. SACV94-676 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13,
1994) (order denying motion to dismiss action).
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. See Righeimer, No. 94-676 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (order granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment).
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to a single election in support of or opposition to such candi-
date, including contributions to political committees supporting
or opposing such candidate, to exceed $150.6
Because "person" is defined to include any "association," "commit-
tee," or "club," however organized, the ordinance limited contributions
to independent expenditure committees.62 A committee, formed to make
independent expenditures supporting the re-election of Willie Brown as
Mayor, challenged that ordinance in San Franciscans for Sensible Gov-
ernment v. Renne.63 A preliminary ruling in this litigation also declared
the ordinance constitutionally problematic. On September 8, 1999-less
than two months before the November municipal elections in San Fran-
cisco-the District Court for the Northern District of California prelimi-
narily enjoined San Francisco from enforcing its ordinance, holding that
the plaintiffs demonstrated both irreparable harm and a likelihood of
success on the merits of their First Amendment challenge to the ordi-64
nance. In a short, unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction,65
and Willie Brown's supporters waged an active independent expendi-
66tures campaign on his behalf in the November 1999 election. The City
of San Francisco eventually reached a settlement agreement with the
plaintiffs, in which it agreed to no longer enforce the ordinance against
committees making only independent expenditures, although the settle-
ment specifies that it will not have preclusive effect in litigation over any
future legislation adopted by San Francisco.67
The third case, heard in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California, involved the following ordinance that was en-
acted in 1995 in the city of Irvine, California:
6
61. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE art. XII, § 16.508(a) (2000).
62. Id. at § 16.508.
63. San Franciscans for Sensible Gov't v. Renne, No. 99-02456 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
1999) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction) (on file with Catholic
University Law Review).
64. See id. at 15.
65. See San Franciscans for Sensible Gov't v. Renne, No. 99-16995 (9th Cir. Oct. 20,
1999) (order affirming order granting preliminary injunction) (on file with Catholic Uni-
versity Law Review).
66. See Zachary Coile, Floodgates Opened to Campaign Spending, S.F. EXAMINER,
Oct. 21, 1999, at A26.
67. See San Franciscans for Sensible Gov't v. Renne, No. C99-2456 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(stipulated judgment).
68. As reflected in documents produced by the city during the litigation, a committee
appointed by the Irvine City Council "voted to delete [IMC 1-2-404(B)] on the advice of
the City Attorney due to the fact that this provision is currently being challenged in court
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Any person, including any committee, that makes any inde-
pendent expenditure during an election cycle in support of or
opposition to any City candidate, shall not accept any contribu-
tion(s) from any person which exceeds in the aggregate the
amount set forth in this section for that election cycle [currently
$320, adjusted for inflation].69
A local political action committee (PAC) challenged the Irvine ordi-
nance in Lincoln Club of Orange County v. City of Irvine. ° This PAC
tried to participate in the November 1998 Irvine municipal elections by
making independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to Irvine
candidates, and again sought to participate in the November 2000 elec-
tions.7' In May 2000, the district court denied the city's motion to dismiss
but, unlike Righeimer, did not do so on substantive grounds.72 In August
2000, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and
instead granted the city's cross-motion for summary judgment, holding in
a short minute order that the city had "serpentined its way through the
applicable cases and drafted an ordinance that escapes unconstitutional-
ity. ' 73 The court reasoned that because the city's ordinance facially re-
stricted only contributions (not expenditures) made to committees mak-
ing "candidate-related independent expenditures," such contributions
could be regulated, apparently without subjecting the regulations to strict
scrutiny.74 "Restricting contributions made to independent expenditure
committees engaged in candidate-related expenditures," noted the court,
"can be said to be a constitutionally valid means to curtail any one per-
son or committee from making an unlimited candidate 'expenditure,'
thereby reducing the Buckley concerns of corruption or the appearance
thereof."75 The case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court
via a Huntington Beach lawsuit." The district court had issued its ruling denying
Huntington Beach's motion to dismiss and holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally
infringed upon First Amendment rights nearly four months before this document was writ-
ten.
69. IRVINE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 1-2-404(B) (2000).
70. Lincoln Club of Orange County v. City of Irvine, No. 99-1262 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16,
2000), appeal docketed, No. 99-CU-1262, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28,2000).
71. See Complaint, Lincoln Club of Orange County v. City of Irvine, No. 99-1262
(C.D. Cal. 1999).
72. See Lincoln Club, No. 99-1262 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2000) (order denying defen-
dant's motion for judgment on the pleadings).
73. Id. No. 99-1262 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2000) (ruling granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment; denying plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, or, in the al-
ternative, for preliminary injunction).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)).
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Other local governments have enacted similar ordinances. In Orange
County, California, for example, seven of the twenty-eight municipal ju-
risdictions have ordinances restricting contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees. In addition to the Huntington Beach and Irvine
ordinances discussed above, Laguna Beach limits such contributions to
$250.7' Laguna Niguel imposes a $350 limit if the committee spends or
intends to spend more than $1,000 in the city's elections.78 Anaheim (the
home of Disneyland) caps such contributions at $1,000.' 9 Orange City's
cap is set at $500,80 and Orange County imposes a $1,000 limitation on
contributions to committees making independent expenditures in super-
visorial elections.81 Several state ordinances impose similar limits on con-
76. See Lincoln Club, No. 99-CU-1262 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2000).
77. See LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 1, § 1.14.030(c) (2000). This code
provides:
No person or committee that spends or incurs independent expenditures during
the twelve months preceding a city election on independent expenditures sup-
porting or opposing candidates, or supporting or opposing the recall of an elec-
tive city officer, shall accept any contribution or contributions from any person
totaling more than two hundred fifty dollars in an elective city officer or recall
election cycle.
Id.
78. See LAGUNA NIGUEL, CAL., CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITATION
ORDINANCE § 2-8-15(d) (2000). This ordinance provides:
Any person or committee that spends or incurs or intends to spend or incur more
than $1,000 of its independent expenditures during the 12 months preceding a
City election on independent expenditures supporting or opposing one or more
City candidates or City measures shall not accept from any person a contribution
or contributions totaling more than $350.00 for any such City Council election.
Id.
79. See ANAHEIM, CAL., MUN. CODE § 1.09.050 (2000). This code provides:
Any person or committee that spends or incurs more than twenty-five percent of
its independent expenditures during the twelve months preceding a city election
on independent expenditures supporting or opposing city candidate(s) shall not
accept any contribution(s) from any person in excess of the amounts set forth in
Section 1.09.050.010 [$1,000] during the applicable time period.
Id. ch. 1.09.050.040.
80. See ORANGE, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 2, § 2.10.050(C) (2000). This code provides:
Any committee that spends or incurs more than twenty-five (25) percent of its
independent expenditures during the twelve (12) months preceding a City elec-
tion on independent expenditures supporting or opposing a City Candidate or
City Candidates, shall be subject to the contribution limitations set forth in this
chapter, [$500 for regular election cycles, $250 for recall election cycles].
Id.
81. See ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CAMPAIGN REFORM ORDINANCE § 1-6-5(c). This
ordinance provides:
Any person or committee that spends or incurs more than twenty-five (25) per-
cent of its independent expenditures during the twelve (12) months preceding a
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tributions to independent expenditure committees.8
Such ordinances can, and often will, have the effect of barring perma-
nent associations (as opposed to committees formed for the purpose of
participating in a single election) from making any expenditures in mu-
nicipal elections, because such associations will often have accepted
"contributions" in excess of the applicable limits long before deciding to
participate in any given election. The Orange County, California-based
group that challenged the Irvine ordinance, for example, has member-
ship dues of $2,000 annually. This precludes the group, as currently con-
stituted, from making independent expenditures in Huntington Beach,
Irvine, Laguna Beach, and Laguna Niguel elections, and bars it from
making such expenditures in Anaheim, Orange, and Orange County
elections if its expenditures in those cities account for more than twenty-
five percent of its total independent expenditures in that election cycle.83
Of particular concern is the fact that the club was barred from partici-
pating in Irvine's November 1998 municipal elections because of dues it
had accepted before the city had even adopted the ordinance.
The Supreme Court has not addressed specifically whether a campaign
finance law that facially restricts contributions to committees making in-
dependent expenditures in candidate elections, but has an effect of re-
stricting expenditures, should be subject to strict scrutiny or something
County election on independent expenditures supporting or opposing County
candidate(s) shall not accept any contribution(s) from any person in excess of
one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) during the time periods set forth in section 1-6-7
of this division.
Id.
82. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-203(k) (Michie 2000) ("An independent expen-
diture committee may not accept any contribution or cumulative contributions in excess of
five hundred dollars ($500) in value from any person or business."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 121.150(4),(6),(10) (Michie Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 257, app. § 10-1-2(a)(1)
(West 1995) ("No person or family may contribute more than five thousand dollars
($5000) to a political action committee or a party committee in any calendar year.").
83. Cf. IRVINE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 1-2-404(B) (2000) (establishing contribution
limits). The mere possibility that such groups could make independent expenditures by
reducing their annual dues should not alter the conclusion that such restrictions affect ex-
penditures. Consequently, the group challenging this ordinance will have to reduce its an-
nual dues from $2,000 to $80 (1/4 of the $320 currently permitted under the ordinance per
four-year election cycle), one twenty-fifth the current level, or expand its current member-
ship of about 300 to approximately 7500, so as to comply with this requirement. Moreo-
ver, government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, interfere with the internal
organization or affairs of a private association unless its interference is narrowly tailored
to further a compelling interest (i.e. strict scrutiny). See Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). The radical change in dues structure and/or membership that
would be required for such groups to exercise their First Amendment right to participate
in the political process would be a significant intrusion into the club's internal structure
and affairs, requiring that such ordinances should be strictly scrutinized.
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less than strict scrutiny. In two closely analogous contexts, however, the
Court has come down on opposite sides of what must necessarily be a
very fine line.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a restriction
on contributions to candidates should be treated as a restriction on ex-
penditures because of its effect on expenditures. The Court noted that:
The overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to
require candidates and political committees to raise funds from
a greater number of persons and to compel people who would
otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limit to
expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to
reduce the total amount of money potentially available to pro-
mote political expression. s
In Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of
Berkeley,85 however, the Supreme Court invalidated a Berkeley ordi-
nance that placed a cap on contributions to committees making inde-
pendent expenditures in support of or in opposition to ballot measures.
86
The Court noted that restrictions on contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees "automatically affects expenditures, 87 and for that
reason (among others), the Court subjected the ordinance to "exacting"
scrutiny.m Although the Court did not precisely define "exacting" scru-
tiny, the Court has used "exacting" and "strict" scrutiny interchangeably
in other contexts,89 and appears to have done so in Citizens Against Rent
Control as well. 90
The ordinances under consideration here fall delicately between the
84. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) (per curiam).
85. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
86. Id. at 300.
87. Id. at 299.
88. Id. at 294, 298.
89. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (defining "exacting
scrutiny" to mean that a restriction can be upheld "only if it is narrowly tailored to serve
an overriding state interest").
90. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring only partly in the judgment because
he believed that the majority was "silent" about the standard of review it was applying.
Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., concurring). Yet the majority
was not silent, twice stating that it was applying exacting judicial review. See id. at 294,
298. Furthermore, the Court expressly stated that "[t]he contribution limit.., automati-
cally affects expenditures" and therefore "plainly contravenes both the right of association
and the speech guarantees of the First Amendment." Id. at 299-300. Unlike Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201
(1981) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (CMA), Justice Marshall's opinion in
Citizens Against Rent Control was not necessary to the Court's judgment; therefore, it has
no precedential weight.
[Vol. 50:13
Strictly Scrutinizing Campaign Finance Restrictions
circumstances addressed in these two opinions. On the one hand, these
ordinances involve limits on contributions to independent expenditure
committees, not the limits on contributions to candidates that were at is-
sue in Buckley. On the other hand, the committees subject to the ordi-
nances make independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to
candidates, not ballot measures which were at issue in Citizens Against
Rent Control. Thus, unless one is willing to subscribe to the view that
Citizens Against Rent Control implicitly overruled Buckley, a rationale
must be found that reconciles these otherwise incompatible holdings to
analyze the middle case appropriately.
The Buckley Court offered two arguments to defend its claim that con-
tribution limits do not affect expenditures, yet neither distinguishes
Buckley from Citizens Against Rent Control. First, the Court noted that
"[t]he overall effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to require
candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number
of persons." 9' But the same can be said of contributions to independent
expenditure committees (as the Buckley Court itself seemed to acknowl-
edge). In either case, there is no effect on expenditures, only if one as-
sumes that the candidate or independent expenditure committee can
simply raise funds from a greater number of people.
It may be argued that the assumption is simply false with respect to in-
dependent expenditure committees. In the Lincoln Club case, for exam-
ple, membership would have to expand from 300 to 7,500 individuals in
order to make up for the lower contribution limit, an expansion that is
both impractical and barred by the club's bylaws. Yet the assumption is
even more far-fetched in the candidate context. Candidates price dis-
criminate in ways that must make even the airlines green with envy. In
particular, a candidate can receive $10,000 in contributions from some
donors and not be precluded from accepting contributions of $100, $10,
or less from other donors. The only reasonable assumption to draw from
this behavior is that candidates persuade as many people as they can to
make contributions at each contribution level. Thus, imposing a contri-
bution limit, even (perhaps especially) in the candidate context, will
"automatically affect expenditures." 9 Buckley's analysis here is simply
counterintuitive, and it may well be, at least on this point, that Citizens
91. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) (per curiam).
92. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299. Arguably, this may be more true
for candidates than it is for certain kinds of independent expenditure committees. Com-
mittees such as the Lincoln Club, for example, openly impose significant annual dues.
Under general economic principles, a reduction in dues would likely result in a greater
pool of potential members.
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Against Rent Control should be read as implicitly rejecting this rationale
underlying the Buckley holding.
Second, Buckley noted that contribution limits would "compel people
who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory lim-
its to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to re-
duce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political
expression."93 According to Buckley, overall political expression would
not be affected by contribution limits, just shifted from candidates to
noncandidates. 94
Unfortunately, this argument also does not distinguish Citizens Against
Rent Control from Buckley. It can just as easily be said that a limit on
contributions to independent expenditure committees simply compels
would-be contributors to make independent expenditures on their own,
and simply shifts, rather than reduces, "the total amount of money po-
tentially available to promote political expression."9'5
The Citizens Against Rent Control Court rejected such an argument,
recognizing instead that some people choose to make their political
voices heard through the medium of a political committee.96 Because
these people would not simply shift their contribution moneys into solo
political expenditures, the Court rightly recognized that the contribution
limit "automatically affects expenditures."97 But the same is equally true
of contributors to candidates, and perhaps even more so. Many con-
tributors simply choose to make their political voices heard by using the
unique bully pulpit opportunity afforded by another's candidacy. In-
deed, the Court's analysis in Buckley seems incredibly na've on this
point.
Having once been a candidate for federal office, I can safely say that
very few contributors would engage in the same amount of political ex-
pression on their own as they are willing (or can be persuaded) to make
possible via contributions to candidates. A limitation on contributions,
therefore, necessarily affects expenditures, whether those contributions
were destined for candidates or for independent expenditure commit-
tees. Perhaps Citizens Against Rent Control should also be read to im-
plicitly reject this rationale underlying the Buckley holding.
Looking at whether a contribution limit "affects expenditures," there-
fore, does not help resolve the inconsistency between Buckley and Citi-
93. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
94. Id. at 21-22.
95. Id. at 22.
96. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299.
97. /d.
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zens Against Rent Control. Buckley's apparent lower level of scrutiny
was also based on the type of message that a contribution conveyed,
however. The Buckley Court held that a limitation on contributions to
candidates "entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's
ability to engage in free communication." '98 The Court reasoned that
such a "contribution serves as a general expression for the candidate and
his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the sup-
port."99 The Court then noted that "[t]he quantity of communication by
the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contri-
bution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic
act of contributing."1 ° The Court concluded that "[w]hile contributions
may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association
to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contribu-
tor."1 °
On its face, the Buckley Court's "speech-by-proxy" rationale for con-
tributors applies equally to contributions made to "association[s]" and
"candidate[s]." '02 The broader application to "associations," however,
must be viewed as dicta because Buckley involved only restrictions on
contributions to candidates, not restrictions on contributions to noncan-
didate associations.03 Any other reading of Buckley would irreconcilably
conflict with Citizens Against Rent Control, when the Court applied "ex-
acting" scrutiny in part because a restriction on contributions to inde-
pendent expenditure committees "imposes a significant restraint on the
freedom of expression of. .those individuals who wish to express their
views through committees. ' ° Citizens Against Rent Control, then, must
at the very least be viewed as rejecting the broader, obiter dicta applica-
tion of the Buckley "speech-by-proxy" rationale.
Restrictions on contributions to independent expenditure committees
also infringe upon the First Amendment's freedom of association guar-
antee, particularly because the collective voice of the association's mem-
bers is enhanced when joined together. Yet the Supreme Court has also
come down on opposite sides of a very thin line with respect to the effect
that contribution limits have on the freedom of association. In Citizens
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22.




103. Id. at 6-7 (discussing the statutes at issue).
104. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981).
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Against Rent Control, the Court held that restrictions on contributions to
independent expenditure committees infringe on an organization's
would-be donors' right of association and were therefore subject to "ex-
acting" scrutiny.' 5 On the other hand, the identical argument was recog-
nized and rejected in Buckley, in the context of contributions to candi-
dates as well as political associations:
The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations also im-
pinge on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribu-
tion, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person
with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to
pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals.
The Act's contribution ceilings thus limit one important means
of associating with a candidate or committee, but leave the con-
tributor free to become a member of any political association
and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of
candidates. And the Act's contribution limitations [in contrast
to its expenditure limitations] permit associations and candi-
dates to aggregate large sums of money to promote effect advo-
cacy .... In sum, although the Act's contribution and expendi-
ture limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment
interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more se-
vere restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression
and association than do its limitations on financial contribu-
tions. "
Because the Buckley Court viewed limits on contributions as a less se-
vere restriction on First Amendment interests than other restrictions on
First Amendment rights, it arguably applied a lower level of scrutiny
when assessing such restrictions. 7
Again, reconciling these two opinions seems futile. Making a contribu-
tion serves to associate the contributor with the recipient whether the
contribution is made to a candidate or to an independent expenditure
committee. In both cases, contributions "enabl[e] like-minded persons
to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals."' ' Con-
sequently, the infringement on the right of association affected by a con-
tribution limit is as severe in one context as it is in the other.
105. Id. at 294. The Court further explained that: "To place a Spartan limit-or in-
deed any limit-on individuals wishing to band together to advance their views on ballot
measures, while placing none on individuals acting alone, is clearly a restraint on the right
of association." Id. at 296.
106. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-23.
107. See id. at 23. The Court later held that Buckley did apply a lower level of scrutiny
to contributions. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't, 120 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2000).
108. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
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The only way to reconcile Buckley and Citizens Against Rent Control is
to distinguish the two cases in a way that really has no relevance to the
strength of the "expressive speech" or associational interests at issue.
Buckley dealt with contributions to candidates; Citizens Against Rent
Control dealt with contributions to independent expenditure committees.
Two possibilities are readily available. Buckley dealt with restrictions in
candidate elections, while Citizens Against Rent Control dealt with re-
strictions in ballot measure elections.
While these factual distinctions are relevant to the strength of the gov-
ernment's interest in restricting speech and associational rights, they are
not relevant to the strength of the First Amendment speech and associa-
tional interests (and hence to the level of scrutiny that is appropriate).
Contributions to candidates, in candidate elections, implicate concerns
with quid pro quo corruption in ways that contributions to independent
expenditure committees, in ballot measure elections, simply do not. As
the Court noted in Citizens Against Rent Control, "'[t]he state interest in
preventing corruption of officials ... is not at issue here.""°9 Restrictions
on contributions to candidates are more likely to survive the applicable
level of scrutiny because they actually further the government's interest
in avoiding quid pro quo corruption. That fact, however, says nothing
about whether the degree of scrutiny should be strict and exacting, or
something less.
Put simply, the Buckley Court, and the Nixon Court which relied on
Buckley, improperly allowed the inquiry into whether the restrictions
furthered the government interest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption to
color its assessment of the First Amendment speech and associational in-
terests that were being infringed. The result is an analytically unsatisfy-
ing distinction between the two cases, lest Citizens Against Rent Control
be viewed as overruling Buckley (and Nixon in turn be viewed as rein-
vigorating Buckley at the expense of Citizens Against Rent Control).
So, on which side of the line do restrictions on contributions to com-
mittees making independent expenditures in candidate elections fall?
One is tempted to say that because the distinction between Buckley and
Citizens Against Rent Control is itself analytically unsound, one could
just as readily argue for either side. After all, this Article previously dis-
cussed two alternative versions of the distinguishing circumstances, one
109. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297, 299 (quoting C & C Plywood
Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978): "Whatever may be the state interest or
degree of that interest in regulating and limiting contributions to or expenditures of a can-
didate or a candidate's committees there is no significant state or public interest in cur-
tailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure.").
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of which cuts in favor of Buckley while the other cuts in favor of Citizens
Against Rent Control. The contributions under consideration here, like
those in Citizens Against Rent Control, are made to independent expen-
diture committees, not to candidates. Yet, they are made to committees
making independent expenditures in candidate elections such as those at
issue in Buckley, not in ballot measure elections.
Another holding from Buckley itself, however, together with the
holding in FEC v. National Conservative PAC,"° prevents us from being
agnostic between these two positions. Buckley invalidated limits on indi-
viduals who made independent expenditures in candidate elections, and it
held that because such expenditures were unconnected to candidates by
definition, the restrictions did not sufficiently further the government's
interest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption to pass constitutional mus-
ter."' NCPAC extended the ruling and invalidated restrictions on com-
mittees making independent expenditures in candidate elections, for the
112same reasons.
Because, according to these holdings, independent expenditures them-
selves do not sufficiently implicate concerns with quid pro quo corrup-
tion to warrant infringement on First Amendment speech rights, contri-
butions to independent expenditure committees, which are even further
removed from candidates (and therefore from any concern with quid pro
quo corruption), simply cannot sufficiently further the government's
anti-corruption interest. That was the precise holding of the Central Dis-
trict of California in Righeimer,"3 and it is analytically sound.
Moreover, it is a position recently recognized by the lead opinion in
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC. 4 Justice
Breyer, in an opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, stated:
Contributors seeking to avoid the effect of the $1,000 [limit on
contributions to candidates] indirectly by donations to the na-
tional party could spend that same amount of money (or more)
themselves more directly by making their own independent ex-
penditures promoting the candidate .... If anything, an inde-
pendent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but
controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would
seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) in-
110. 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (NCPAC).
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
112. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 497.
113. Righeimer v. City of Huntington Beach, No. SACV94-676-AHS (C.D. Cal. Oct.
13, 1994) (order denying motion to dismiss action).
114. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
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dependent expenditure made directly by that donor. In any
case, the constitutionally significant fact, present equally in both
instances, is the lack of coordination between the candidate and
the source of the expenditure."'
Although only a plurality opinion, four of the remaining six Justices
would have gone further. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, would have treated all party coordinated
expenditures-"contributions" under federal election law-as protected
by the First Amendment.'1 6 Justice Thomas would have gone further
still, rejecting the Buckley distinction between contributions and expen-
ditures altogether."7
When dealing with independent expenditure committees, drawing the
line between the ballot-measure-election and the candidate election sim-
ply does not hold analytical water. The line between independent ex-
penditures (and the contributions that make them possible), on one
hand, and contributions to candidates, on the other, does. Moreover, this
latter line is derived from Buckley's own focus on furthering the govern-
ment's anti-corruption interest. And it is a line that is consistent with the
recognition in Buckley, NCPAC, and Colorado Republican that inde-
pendent expenditures do not implicate quid pro quo corruption concerns.
Accordingly, because limits on contributions to committees making in-
dependent expenditures "automatically affect expenditures," and do so
in a context that does not sufficiently implicate the government's anti-
corruption concerns, the "exacting" scrutiny applied in Citizens Against
Rent Control should be applied to the restrictions under consideration
here.
The line between contributions to candidates and candidate-controlled
committees, on the one hand, and contributions to noncandidate com-
mittees, on the other, may be subtle, but it is not without some merit. As
the Buckley Court saw it, the principal message expressed by a contribu-
tion to a candidate is one of support for the candidate's election to office.
With respect to that message, Buckley correctly stated that such a mes-
sage was not undermined by limits on the amount of the contribution. In
contrast, the principal message expressed by a contribution to a noncan-
didate committee is agreement with and furtherance of that committee's
115. Id. at 617 (emphasis added) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-48 and NCPAC, 454
U.S. at 498).
116. Id. at 630 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
117. See id. at 636 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas
stated: "In my view, the distinction lacks constitutional significance, and I would not ad-
here to it. As Chief Justice Burger put it: '[C]ontributions and expenditures are two sides
of the same First Amendment coin."' Id. (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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views. As the Court noted in Citizens Against Rent Control, contribu-
tions to such committees are made by people who join "with others to
advocate common views."" 8 The ability to express those views is under-
mined by restrictions on contributions, every bit as much as if the com-
mittee's expenditures were themselves restricted.
This formulation of the Buckley "speech-by-proxy" rationale is not en-
tirely satisfying, of course, for it ignores the fact that contributions to
candidates, like contributions to independent expenditure committees,
are often made by people who wish to advocate the views being pro-
pounded by the candidate, and who, in fact, utilize the candidate's
unique bully pulpit position to advance their own views. But that is a
flaw in the Buckley analysis itself, not in the distinction between Buckley
and Citizens Against Rent Control offered above. The distinction at least
has the virtue of reconciling the two opinions, and it is consistent with the
holdings in two other major cases decided by the Court about the same
time as Citizens Against Rent Control.
In California Medical Ass'n v. FEC,"9 decided the term before Citizens
Against Rent Control, the Court tested the constitutionality of restric-
tions on contributions to multicandidate committees. Federal election
law permits multicandidate committees to contribute $5,000 to candi-
dates (instead of the $1,000 that individuals and other committees may
contribute).2 " The Court upheld the restrictions in order to prevent eva-
sion of the $1,000 restriction on individual contributions to candidates, a
restriction that Buckley upheld because it furthered the government's in-
terest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption of candidates or the appear-
ance of such corruption. Although no such concern presents itself in re-
strictions on contributions to independent expenditure committees,
which by definition have no involvement with candidates, that distin-
guishing fact, like the fact that Citizens Against Rent Control dealt with
ballot measure elections rather than candidate elections, is relevant only
to the strength of the government's interest, not to the level of scrutiny
that should be applied to judge that interest.
More relevant for present purposes is the fact that in CMA, Justice
Marshall attempted to apply the "speech by proxy" rationale beyond the
contribution-to-candidate context at issue in Buckley. 12' This position,
had it prevailed, would have strongly suggested that the "speech by
proxy" rationale should be applied to the contributions under considera-
118. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299 (1981).
119. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion) (CMA).
120. Seeid. at 185.
121. Id. at 196.
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tion here. Justice Marshall garnered only a plurality in support of his po-
122
sition, however, so his opinion is of "no precedential value.' 23
Justice Blackmun, who provided the dispositive fifth vote in CMA, ex-
pressly rejected Justice Marshall's contention that contributions to multi-
candidate committees were merely speech by proxy entitled to lesser
First Amendment protection.24 Although Justice Blackmun recognized
that there was language in Buckley "that might suggest [the plurality's]
conclusion," he noted that Buckley also stated that "'contribution and
expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment
interests', and that 'governmental action which may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.'
12
Because Justice Blackmun supplied the necessary fifth vote, and his
opinion is narrower on the merits than that of the plurality, his opinion
controls. 2  It is controlling only for points that can be said to be fairly
subsumed within the reasoning of the plurality.1 27 That is not the case on
the standard of review question, for the plurality did not believe that
strict scrutiny was required, and as a result did not address whether in its
view the statute at issue in the case survived strict scrutiny. 28 The four
122. See id. at 184.
123. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.30 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that a plurality opinion is of "no precedential value"); see also Bratton v.
City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 885 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a plurality decision has "lit-
tle precedential value"); cf. Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that a state supreme court plurality opinion was of "no precedential
value").
124. CMA, 453 U.S. at 202 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(per curiam)).
126. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976): "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single ra-
tionale ... enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred."'); see, e.g., Romano v. Oklahoma,
512 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1994).
127. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc). The King court
stated:
Marks is workable-one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as 'narrower'
than another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opin-
ions. In essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator
of the Court's reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at
least five Justices who support the judgment.
Id. at 781. But see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d
682, 694 (3rd Cir. 1991) (noting that when "the majority votes to uphold a law as constitu-
tional, the 'narrowest grounds' principle will identify as authoritative the standard articu-
lated by a Justice or Justices that would uphold the fewest laws as constitutional"), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
128. See CMA, 453 U.S. at 195-97. Adding to the confusion, Justice Blackmun's de-
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dissenting Justices would have dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional
grounds,'2 9 and although three of four dissenting Justices sat on the Court
in Citizens Against Rent Control and subscribed to the "exacting" scru-
tiny applied in that case, they did not reach the question in CMA.
130
All that can really be said is that the "speech by proxy" rationale ap-
plied in Buckley did not garner the support of a majority of the Court in
CMA. The distinction we have drawn above is therefore consistent with
CMA, although CMA is not conclusive authority to support the distinc-
tion.
If there were any doubt that the Court has rejected the "speech by
proxy" rationale to assess restrictions on contributions to independent
expenditure committees at the lower level of scrutiny applied in Buckley
to candidate contribution restrictions, all doubt was removed in FEC v.
NCPA C.'3' In NCPAC, the Court expressly rejected the government's
contention that contributions to independent expenditure committees
were merely "speech by proxy" entitled, under Buckley, to less First
Amendment protection than other speech.'32 As a result, the Court held
that "their collective action in pooling their resources to amplify their
voices" was "entitled to full First Amendment protection'' 33 and applied
strict scrutiny to invalidate the independent expenditure restrictions at
issue in the case.
However subtle the line between Buckley and Citizens Against Rent
scription of the "closest scrutiny" test that he would apply to both contribution and ex-
penditure restrictions appears to be somewhat less stringent than the strict scrutiny that
the Court has clearly applied to expenditure limitations. He wrote: "Contribution limita-
tions can be upheld, only 'if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational free-
doms."' Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25).
129. See id. at 209 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
130. The fourth dissenter in CMA was Justice Stewart, who retired at the end of the
October 1980 term and was replaced by Justice O'Connor by the time the Court decided
Citizens Against Rent Control. Justice O'Connor was clearly in the "exacting scrutiny"
camp in Citizens Against Rent Control, joining Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in
the judgment. Citizens Against Rent Control for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 302 (1.981) (Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., concurring). Justice Stewart's position
on the subject cannot be ascertained with any certainty.
131. 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (NCPAC).
132. Id. at 494-95. The Court found that the "First Amendment freedom of associa-
tion [was] squarely implicated" and that contributions to independent expenditure com-
mittees "are mechanisms by which large numbers of individuals of modest means can join
together in organizations which serve to 'amplif[y] the voice of their adherents."' Id. at
494 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Citizens
Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 295-96). "[T]he 'proxy speech' approach is not useful in
this case," the Court noted, because "contributors obviously like the message they are
hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message." Id. at 495.
133. Id. at 495.
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Control may be, it seems to be the line that the Court has drawn and ap-
plied over this series of cases. Despite the fact that the ordinances under
consideration here pose limits on contributions to committees making
independent expenditures in candidate elections rather than ballot
measure elections, subjecting those ordinances to the "exacting" scrutiny
on the Citizens Against Rent Control side of the line is the only position
consistent with Buckley, on the one hand, and Citizens Against Rent
Control, NCPAC, and Justice Blackmun's controlling opinion in CMA,
on the other, for several reasons.
First, unlike the primary expressive purpose of announcing support for
a candidate that the Court believed was furthered by the contributions to
candidates at issue in Buckley, contributions to independent expenditure
committees are made primarily to further the committee's views. This
contention is true whether the committee is participating in a ballot
measure election or a candidate election. 34 Second, the Buckley Court
expressly relied upon the fact that restrictions on contributions to candi-
dates leave contributors free to express their political speech in other
ways-either through individual independent expenditures or by be-
coming "a member of any political association.""' Restricting that asso-
ciation not only seems distinct from the restriction at issue in Buckley,
but actually undermines one of the grounds upon which the Buckley de-
cision rests. Finally, the Supreme Court has not confined Citizens
Against Rent Control's "exacting" scrutiny to the ballot measure context.
In NCPAC, the Supreme Court cited Citizens Against Rent Control to
support its application of strict scrutiny to restrictions on independent
expenditure committees opposing candidates because such committees
"are mechanisms by which large numbers of individuals of modest means
can join together in organizations which serve to 'amplif[y] the voice of
their adherents.' ' ,36 The Court elaborated:
[C]ontributors obviously like the message they are hearing from
these [independent expenditure] organizations and want to add
their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with
their money. To say that their collective action in pooling their
resources to amplify their voices is not entitled to full First
Amendment protection would subordinate the voices of those of
modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be
134. See id. As the Court noted in NCPAC, such "contributors obviously like the mes-
sage they are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that mes-
sage." Id.
135. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
136. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 494 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 295-
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able to buy expensive media ads with their own resources.131
Several lower courts have followed Citizens Against Rent Control and
strictly scrutinized restrictions on contributions to committees making
independent expenditures in candidate elections despite the fact that
Citizens Against Rent Control involved a ballot measure election restric-
tion. In the Righeimer case, for example, the district court held that the
Huntington Beach ordinance was subject to strict scrutiny, and explicitly
cited Citizens Against Rent Control as the basis for its holding."8 The
District Court for the Northern District of California went even further,
holding in San Franciscans for Sensible Government that "making contri-
butions to PACs ... which make only independent expenditures ... is
highly protected speech and may not be regulated." '39
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also adopted this position:
"State-enforced limits on contributions to political action committees sti-
fle 'not only free political speech, but also free political association,' and
are reviewed according to a strict scrutiny standard., 140 And, although
not specifically relying on Citizens Against Rent Control, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and the District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas have likewise subjected limits on contributions to independent
expenditure committees to strict scrutiny. 4'
In contrast, the same district court that decided Righeimer seems to
have rejected strict scrutiny in the Lincoln Club case.'4 2 Indeed, although
it is hard to ascertain from the short minute order just what level of scru-
tiny the district court applied, it appears to have adopted something akin
to rationale basis review.4 3 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
137. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
138. See Righeimer v. City of Huntington Beach, No. SACV94-676 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13,
1994) (order denying motion to dismiss action) (citing Citizens Against Rent Control, 454
U.S. at 294).
139. San Franciscans for Sensible Gov't v. Renne, No. C99-02456 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
1999) (order granting preliminary injunction), affd, No. 99-16995 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1999)
(on file with Catholic University Law Review).
140. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Day v. Holahan, 34
F.3d 1356,1365 (8th Cir. 1994)).
141. See, e.g., North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 715 (4th Cir.
1999); see also, e.g., Arkansas Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 544
(W.D. Ark. 1998).
142. Lincoln Club of Orange County v. City of Irvine, No. 99-1262 (C.D. Cal. Aug.16,
2000) (ruling granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
143. In the face of disputed evidence about the city's purpose in enacting the contribu-
tion limitations, the court granted summary judgment for the city because "[r]estricting
contributions made to independent expenditure committees engaged in candidate-related
expenditures can be said to be a constitutionally valid means to curtail any one person or
committee from making an unlimited candidate 'expenditure,' thereby reducing the
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in Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry144 and the District Court for the
District of Colorado in Citizens for Responsible Government State PAC
v. Buckley, 45 both applied a lower level of scrutiny when assessing re-
strictions on contributions to PACs that could make both independent
expenditures and contributions to candidates. According to the Sixth
Circuit: "The [Supreme] Court has clearly stated that this type of politi-
cal speech [by proxy] ... does not receive the full First Amendment pro-
tection afforded direct political contributions because limitations on con-
tributions to permanent committees do not significantly infringe on First
Amendment rights.', 146 Similarly, the District Court for the District of
Colorado stated that "political speech does not receive the full protection
afforded direct political contributions" because there is no significant
First Amendment infringement.
1 47
Courts applying strict scrutiny have the better argument and the one
more consistent with prevailing Supreme Court precedent. Terry and
Citizens for Responsible Government mistakenly treated the plurality
opinion in CMA as if it were binding precedent and did not address the
Court's more authoritative opinion in Citizens Against Rent Control.
Lincoln Club also mistakenly relied upon the plurality opinion in CMA,
and its resort to what was tantamount to a rational basis review finds no
support even in the slightly-less-than-strict scrutiny the Buckley Court
applied to restrictions on contributions to candidates. Quite simply, the
courts subjecting restrictions on contributions to independent expendi-
ture committees to strict scrutiny have the better argument because such
restrictions affect expenditures and intrude upon associational rights.
Further, it is the only position consistent with a rationale that reconciles
the Supreme Court's decisions in Citizens Against Rent Control, NCPAC,
and Justice Blackmun's opinion in CMA, on the one hand, and Buckley
and Nixon, on the other.
Even if the standard of review applied in Buckley for contributions to
candidates applied to the ordinances under consideration here, Buckley
Buckley concerns of corruption or the appearance thereof." Id. (emphasis added). By
relying at the summary judgment stage on what "can be said" to be the purpose rather
than what the city was able to prove with undisputed evidence, the court seems to have
taken refuge in the doctrine that legislation will be sustained if it furthers any conceivable
legitimate government purpose, a doctrine appropriate only under Equal Protection ra-
tionale basis review, but not under any of the more strict levels of scrutiny. See, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (holding that "[a] statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it").
144. 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997).
145. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Colo. 1999).
146. Kentucky Right to Life, 108 F.3d at 649.
147. Citizens for Responsible Gov't, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
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actually held that such restrictions on associational activity are "'subject
to the closest scrutiny. ''"1 4" Although, as the Court in Nixon held, that
may not be the strictest level of scrutiny, it is still scrutiny with a punch-
something more than the intermediate scrutiny that the Court applies
when assessing restrictions on speech conduct or time-place-manner re-
strictions, for example. 49 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted,
Buckley "applied a somewhat less stringent test than strict scrutiny."15
The test, however, "is still a 'rigorous' one,''. and the government must
still demonstrate "a sufficiently important interest and employ means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational free-
doms."'52 As the Court noted in Nixon, "a contribution limit involving
'significant interference' with associational rights . .. could survive [only]
if the Government demonstrated that contribution regulation was
'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest."' 53
The ordinances under consideration here clearly and significantly re-
strict associational activity. Because they do not (and under Buckley,
could not) restrict potential contributors from individually making inde-
pendent expenditures of any amount on behalf of or against candidates,
the only effect of such ordinances is to limit individuals who wish to asso-
ciate together for political advocacy. As such, the ordinances must, at
the very least, be "'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important in-
terest.",114 For the same reason we distinguished Citizens Against Rent
Control from Buckley above, restrictions on contributions to independ-
ent expenditure committees cannot meet even this watered-down test.
III. LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE
COMMITTEES DO NOT FURTHER GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN
AVOIDING CORRUPTION OR THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION OF
CANDIDATES
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions imposed by FECA
on contributions to candidates because the infringement on the First
148. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-6.1 (1958)).
149. Cf id. at 16 (stating that the Court has never reduced the exacting scrutiny re-
quired by the First Amendment).
150. Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312,
1322 (9th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29).
152. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
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Amendment was closely drawn to further the government's sufficiently
compelling interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption of candidates
or the appearance of such corruption.'55 However, the same Court struck
down FECA's limitations on independent expenditures by individuals
because "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an ex-
penditure with the candidate or his agent ... alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate.', 5 6 The Court extended that ruling in NCPAC when
it invalidated restrictions on expenditures made by independent expendi-
ture committees, noting:
It is of course hypothetically possible here, as in the case of the
independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates
may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC ex-
penditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for
the supporting messages. But here, as in Buckley, the absence
of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of
the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for im-
proper commitments from the candidate.
5 7
By definition, as the District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held in the Righeimer case, contributions to independent expenditure
committees "are even more remotely connected to the dangers of cor-
ruption of candidates than are the independent expenditures themselves,
so likewise are not justified by any sufficiently compelling governmental
interest.' 5 8 The Eighth Circuit has explained why: "the concern of a po-
litical quid pro quo for large contributions, which becomes a possibility
when the contribution is to an individual candidate, ... is not present
155. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29.
156. Id. at 47.
157. FEC v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480,498 (1985) (NCPAC).
158. Righeimer v. City of Huntington Beach, No. SACV94-676 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13,
1994) (order denying motion to dismiss action); see also Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp.
1211, 1216-17 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (addressing separately limits on contributions to candi-
dates and contributions to independent expenditure committees, although not reaching
the latter because of the plaintiffs' lack of standing), affd in relevant part, 146 F.3d 563,
566-67 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998); National Black Police Ass'n v.
District of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 858 F. Supp. 251, 256-57 (D.D.C. 1994)
(distinguishing between limits on contributions to candidates and limits on contributions
to independent expenditures and citing Minnesotans for Term Limits v. Hayes, No. 3-93-
766 (D. Minn. May 27, 1994)); San Franciscans for Sensible Gov't v. Renne, No. C-99-
02456CW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 1999) (order granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary in-
junction) (granting motion because the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits of their challenge to the city's limit on contributions to independent expendi-
ture committees), affd, No. 99-16995 (9th Cir. Oct. 20,1999).
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when the contribution is given to a political committee or fund that by
itself does not have legislative power."'5"9 Quite simply, a limitation on
contributions to independent expenditure committees lacks the necessary
causal link to the legitimate governmental interest in avoiding corruption
and the appearance of corruption; thus, any attempt to bring such ordi-
nances under the Buckley umbrella cannot properly be sustained.
The same distinction between direct contributions to candidates and
contributions to independent expenditure committees underlay the
Court's decision in Citizens Against Rent Control.61 Although, as dis-
cussed above, the committee challenging the Berkeley ordinance was
formed to oppose a ballot measure rather than a candidate, NCPAC's
severing of the connection between independent expenditures and can-
didate corruption in candidate elections renders that distinction immate-
rial. In both cases, restrictions on the contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees are unconstitutional because the expenditures
made possible by the contributions did not implicate the government's
concern with quid pro quo corruption .
The Supreme Court did uphold a $5,000 cap on contributions to multi-
candidate committees in CMA' 6 ' but the plurality opinion in that case is
easily, and properly, distinguished. Indeed, the controlling opinion in the
case strongly supports the claim that contributions to independent ex-
penditure committees cannot be restricted because they do not further
the government's legitimate anti-corruption purpose.' 6'
Under federal election law, individuals may contribute a maximum of
$1,000 per election to any candidate and $25,000 cumulatively to federal
candidates in any given year.'16 Political committees that qualify as "mul-
159. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-
27). The Eighth Circuit also held that the $100 limit at issue was "too low to allow mean-
ingful participation in protected political speech and association." Id. at 1366. Although
that discussion was unnecessary to the court's holding invalidating limits on contributions
to independent expenditure committees (given the court's recognition that the State's in-
terest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption was not furthered by such limits), the statute at
issue also limited contributions by such committees directly to candidates. See id. at 1365.
Accordingly, the discussion was necessary to the court's holding that the $100 limit was
different in kind from the $1,000 limitation upheld in Buckley. See id. at 1366.
160. Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 296 (1981).
161. FEC v. National Conservation PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496-500 (1985) (NCPA C).
162. See id. at 497; Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 297-99.
163. California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 195-99 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(CMA).
164. See id. at 200-01.
165. See id. (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)).
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ticandidate" committees, on the other hand, may contribute $5,000 to
candidates.' 66 The Court recognized that this statutory disparity provided
an opportunity for individuals to "evade" both the $1,000 limit and the
$25,000 aggregate limit "by channeling funds through a multicandidate
political committee.' ' 67 Accordingly, the Court upheld the limitation as
"an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect the in-
tegrity of the contribution restrictions upheld ... in Buckley."'
6
Significantly, Justice Blackmun stressed that "this analysis suggests
that a different result would follow if [the limits] were applied to contri-
butions to a political committee established for the purpose of making
independent expenditures, rather than contributions to candidates.' '69
Justice Blackmun stated that "[m]ulticandidate political committees are.
. . essentially conduits for contributions to candidates, and as such they
pose a perceived threat of actual or potential corruption ... in contrast
[to] contributions to a committee that makes only independent expendi-
tures [, which] pose no such threat."' 70 Justice Blackmun's more narrow
opinion was controlling because it was necessary to the disposition of the
171case.
Finally, in its most recent case addressing this subject in a closely
analogous context, Justice Breyer, writing for a plurality of the Court in
Colorado Republican Committee v. FEC,'72 recognized specifically that
the "constitutionally significant fact, present equally" in independent ex-
penditures and in contributions to independent expenditure committees,
"is the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the
expenditure.'
' 73
On the other hand, twenty years ago, the District Court for the District
of Columbia, in Mott v. FEC,174 upheld FECA's limit on contributions to
multicandidate committees when challenged by a contributor who
wished to earmark her contribution for independent expenditures.'75
Mott does not govern the restrictions on contributions to independent
expenditure committees under consideration here for two reasons. First,
166. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 199.
169. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
170. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
171. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
172. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
173. Id. at 617.
174. 494 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1980).
175. Id. at 133, 137.
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the FECA provision at issue in Mott did not distinguish between inde-
pendent expenditure committees and multicandidate committees that
could make contributions directly to candidates.7 6 The same provision
was at issue the following year in the CMA, and as described above, the
dispositive opinion of Justice Blackmun drew such a distinction and
strongly suggested that a restriction on contributions to committees
making only independent expenditures would be unconstitutional.177
Second, and more fundamentally, Mott was decided before the Su-
preme Court in NCPAC completely severed the connection between in-
dependent expenditures and any concern with quid pro quo corruption
of candidates, the only concern that to this day the Court has recognized
as sufficiently compelling to sustain such restrictions. To the extent
Mott's holding ever stood for the proposition that contributions to inde-
pendent expenditure committees (as opposed merely to multicandidate
committees) could be sustained because they furthered the government's
interest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption, that holding simply does
not survive the Supreme Court's decision in NCPA C. 
76
IV. CONCLUSION
Without the nexus to government's legitimate concern with avoiding
corruption or the appearance of corruption of candidates-the only in-
terest that the Supreme Court has recognized as sufficiently compelling
to warrant the intrusion on First Amendment speech and associational
rights effected by restrictions on campaign contributions and expendi-
179tures 9-restrictions on contributions to independent expenditure com-
mittees simply do not pass constitutional muster. That is the result ini-
tially adopted by the Central District of California in Righeimer (though
later rejected in Lincoln Club), and it is the result foreshadowed by the
Northern District of California's order in San Franciscans for Sensible
Government preliminarily enjoining San Francisco from enforcing its re-
strictions. It is the only result that gives full credence to the robust ex-
change of ideas that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
176. Id. at 137 (citing to § 441a(a)(1) of FECA's Amendments).
177. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (CMA).
178. See, e.g., Righeimer v. City of Huntington Beach, No. SACV94-676 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 13, 1994) (order denying motion to dismiss action).
179. See CMA, 453 U.S. at 198-99 (recognizing that the government's interest in pre-
venting evasion of contribution limits was a constitutionally sufficient purpose, but that an
anti-evasion purpose must be read in light of the limits on contributions to candidates that
the Court had upheld in Buckley, limits which furthered an anti-corruption purpose).
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